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Abstract
In this paper we analyze the macroeconomic record of dollarized economies. In  particular, we
investigate whether, as its supporters’ claim, dollarization is associated with lower inflation and
faster growth. We analyze this issue by using a matching estimator technique developed in the
training evaluation literature. Our findings suggest that inflation has been significantly lower in
dollarized nations than in non-dollarized ones. We also find that dollarized nations have had a lower
rate of economic growth than non-dollarized ones. Finally, we find that macroeconomic volatility is
not significantly different across dollarized and non-dollarized economies. We conjecture that the
lower rate of economic growth in dollarized countries is due, at least in part, to these countries’
difficulties in accommodating external disturbances, such as major term of trade and capital flows
shocks.
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I.  Introduction
The recurrence of currency crises in emerging countries has generated an intense
debate on exchange rate policies.  Pegged-but-adjustable exchange rate regimes have
rapidly lost adepts, while hard pegs and freely floating rates have gained in popularity
(See Summers 2000 and Fischer, 2001). A growing number of economists have gone as
far as arguing that (many) emerging nations should completely give up their national
currencies, and adopt an advanced nation’s currency as legal tender. This policy proposal
has come to be known by the general name of “dollarization.”
 Recently, some emerging
countries have, indeed, decided to officially dollarize their economies.  In 2000, for
example, and in the midst of a major crisis, Ecuador abolished its currency, the Sucre,
and adopted the U.S. dollar.  El Salvador adopted the dollar during 2001; and in May
2001, the dollar became legal tender in Guatemala.
1  In other countries, however,
politicians have systematically refused to consider dollarization, even in the face of major
and costly financial crises.  This was the case, for instance, of Argentina during late 2001
and early 2002.
Supporters of dollarization have argued that countries that give up their currency
will be unable to engage in monetary and macroeconomic mismanagement.  Public
finances will stay in balance, macroeconomic policy (or what is left of it) will be
credible, and the external accounts will move within reasonable bounds. According to
this view, dollarization will have two major positive effects on economic performance:
First, inflation will be lower in dollarized than in non dollarized nations. Alesina and
Barro (2001 p. 382), for instance, have argued that adopting another nation’s currency
“eliminates the inflation-bias problem of discretionary monetary policy.”  Second,
countries that give up their currency will tend to grow faster than non-dollarized
countries.  This growth effect is supposed to take place through two channels:  (a)
dollarization will mean lower interest rates, higher investment, and faster growth
(Dornbusch 2001).  And (b), by eliminating exchange rate volatility, dollarization is
                                                          
1 By “officially dollarized” countries, we mean countries that use another nation’s currency.  This “other
currency” needs not be the U.S. dollar, however.  We have excluded countries that use a common supra-
national currency, such as the Euro.  On the selection of exchange rate regimes see, for example, Frankel
(1999).  On analytical aspects of dollarization see Calvo (2001) and Eichengreen and Haussman (1999).
On currency unions see Frankel and Rose (1999).2
suppose to encourage international trade and this, in turn, will result in faster growth.
Rose (2000), and Rose and Van Wincoop (2001), among others, have emphasized this
trade channel.
 2  Other authors, however, have voiced skepticism regarding the alleged
positive effects of dollarization on growth and overall macroeconomic performance.
According to Eichengreen (2001) the evidence on the relationship between monetary
regimes and growth is inconclusive, and does not support the claim that dollarization – or
any exchange rate regime, for that matter – is an important determinant of growth.
3 The
traditional view, on the other hand, is that in countries with a hard peg it is difficult to
accommodate external shocks, including terms of trade and world interest rate
disturbances. This, in turn, will be translated into greater instability and lower economic
growth (Fischer 1976). And Frankel (1999) has argued that there is no unique recipe on
exchange rate policy; while some countries will benefit from hard pegs, for other
countries a floating regime will be more appropriate. 
Surprisingly, until very recently there have been no formal empirical studies on
the economic consequences of dollarization. In particular, international comparative
studies on alternative exchange rate and monetary regimes have traditionally ignored
dollarized countries.  For instance, the comprehensive study on exchange rate regimes,
growth, and inflation by Gosh et al (1995), does not include nations that do not have a
currency of their own.  Likewise, the IMF (1997) study on alternative exchange rate
systems excludes dollarized countries, and the recent paper by Levy-Yeyeti and
Sturzenegger (2001) on exchange rates and economic performance excludes nations that
do not have a central bank.  This lack of empirical evidence means that countries that are
contemplating dollarization have very little information on how other countries have
historically performed under this monetary regime.  Most existing evidence on
dollarization is based on the experience of Panama, a country that has used the US dollar
as legal tender since 1904.
4  Rose and Engel (2000) provided an early empirical analysis
                                                          
2   On analytical aspects of dollarization see Calvo (1999) and Eichengreen and Haussman (1999).
3   Other authors that have been skeptical regarding the benefits of dollarization include Corbo, Velasco
(2001) and Willet (2001).  For a defense of dollarization see Hausmann (1999).  
4  Goldfjan and Olivares (2001) use econometrics to evaluate Panama’s experience with dollarization.
Moreno-Villalaz (1999) provides a detailed analysis of the Panamanian system.  Bogetic (2000) describes
several aspects of dollarization in a number of countries.  As far as we know, Rose and Engel (2000) and
Edwards (2001) are the first two papers to provide a statistical and econometric analysis of economic
performance in dollarized countries and/or currency unions.  3
of economic performance in countries with no currency of their own.  Their analysis,
however, does not emphasize “dollarized” countries – that is countries that use an
advanced nation’s currency --; instead it focuses mostly on currency unions, or countries
whose common currency is not the currency of an advanced nation, but rather the union’s
own currency.  In fact, the Rose and Engel (2000) data set includes 26 countries that do
not have a currency of their own, and have data on real GDP per capita.  Of these 23
countries, only one – Panama -- corresponds to a strictly dollarized nation; the other 25
countries in the data set correspond to currency unions.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the historical macroeconomic record of
dollarized economies. More specifically, we are interested in investigating whether, as its
supporters argue, dollarization is associated with superior macroeconomic performance,
as measured by lower inflation, faster growth and lower growth volatility.  Performing
this type of international comparison, however, is not easy.  The problem is how to define
an appropriate “control” group with which to compare the dollarized nations.  Since
dollarization is not a “natural experiment,” using a broad control group of all non-
dollarized emerging countries is likely to result in biased estimates.  In this paper we
tackle this issue by using a matching estimator technique developed in the training
evaluation literature  (Heckman et. al. 1997).  
In this paper we concentrate on countries and territories that use an advanced
nation’s currency, or countries that have a strictly dollarized system.  That is, we exclude
from the analysis territories and countries that join a monetary union that has a currency
of its own (i.e. the East Caribbean Currency Area or the CFA area in Africa).   The
reason for focusing on strictly dollarized countries is rather simple: to a large extent the
policy debate in the emerging world, and especially in Latin America, is whether these
countries ought to adopt an "advanced" country's currency, as a way of achieving
credibility.  For Argentina, for instance, it is very different to delegate the running of
monetary policy to the Federal Reserve, than delegating it to a MERCOSUR central bank
that would be run by Brazilians and Argentines.  Argentine politicians and economists
rightly ask whether the latter would have any more credibility than their own embattled
Central Bank.  4
Before proceeding, it is useful to point out the ways in which our analysis differs
from other related work in this general area. First, we use a “matching” methodology to
define the appropriate control group.  Second, we focus directly on the most important
macroeconomic variables – real GDP growth, inflation and growth volatility.  Other
studies, in contrast, have analyzed performance in an indirect fashion, and have focused
on ancillary variables such as the level of international trade and/or interest rates. For
instance, Frankel and Rose (2002) have analyzed the way in which currency unions affect
bilateral trade and, through this channel, economic growth.
5  Edwards (1999), and Powel
and Sturzenegger (2000) have investigated the way in which the exchange rate/monetary
regime affects interest rate behavior, and the cost of capital.  And third, in the current
paper we are particularly interested in estimating the actual magnitude of the
“dollartization effect.”  That is we want to know, as precisely as possible, by how many
percentage points countries under a certain regime have outperformed countries with an
alternative regime.  We believe that, by dealing with the “treatment bias” the matching
methodology used in this paper is particularly appropriate for this purpose.
The results reported in this paper suggests quite strongly that inflation has been
significantly lower in dollarized nations, than in non-dollarized ones.  We also find that
dollarized nations have had a lower rate of economic growth than non-dollarized ones.
Statistically speaking, however, this result is not as strong as our finding on inflation
differentials.  Finally, we find that macroeconomic instability – measured by the degree
of volatility of GDP growth – is not significantly different across dollarized and non-
dollarized economies.  We conjecture that the lower rate of economic growth in
dollarized countries is due, at least in part, to these countries’ difficulties in
accommodating external disturbances, such as major term of trade and capital flows
shocks.  Unfortunately, the lack of data precluded us from investigating this issue
formally. Preliminary results for the case of Panama reported in Edwards (2001) and
Edwards and Levy-Yeyati (2002), however, provide some support for this view.  The rest
of the paper is organized as follows: In Section II we provide a preliminary analysis of
                                                          
5   See Klein (2002) for a discussion on dollarization and trade, including a comprehensive bibliography on
the subject.5
historical experiences with “dollarization.” In Section III we present our empirical
analysis using matching estimators.  In Section IV we provide some concluding remarks.
II.  Dollarization Experiences During 1970-1998
II.1  Historical Experiences
Countries that use a foreign currency as legal tender can be divided into two
groups.  The first one corresponds to independent nations, while the second group
includes territories, colonies or regions within a national entity.  Panama is an example of
the first type of country, while Puerto Rico belongs to the second group. Table 1 contains
a list of countries (Panel A) and territories (Panel B) that have had an official dollarized
system at any time during the 1970-1998 period.
 6 We have included information on
population, and on the currency (or currencies) used as legal tender.  As may be seen, the
countries and territories that have had a dollarized monetary system are very small
indeed. Many are city-states well integrated into their neighbors’ economies – Monaco,
Lichtestein, the Vatican and Andorra are good examples. Some of them are not only tiny,
but also have an exciting and romantic origin.  This is the case of Pitcairn Island, the
place where a group of English mutineers and Tahitian women settled in 1790. Many of
the dollarized economies are so small that they do not have data on basic economic
indicators such as inflation or growth. We have been able to collect data on growth for 12
of the 13 independent countries, and for 3 of the territories.  Inflation data are available
for 9 of the independent countries and for the same 3 territories (See Table 1). This lack
of readily available data may explain why most studies on currency unions have only
included one or two strictly dollarized countries in the empirical analysis.
The largest dollarized countries in Panel A are Liberia and Panama.  Only the
latter, however, remains dollarized today; Liberia abandoned the system in the 1980s,
when the government of President Samuel Doe decided to issue local currency as a way
of avoiding the constraints imposed on policy by the dollarized system.
7   The largest
                                                          
6   We follow the U.S. Congress’ Joint Economic Committee, and concentrate on those territories that have
a high degree of administrative autonomy.  There are some borderline cases, however, that may generate
some controversies.   
7   It is not easy to date unequivocally Liberia’s abandonment of the dollarized system.  In July 1974 the
National Bank of Liberia (NBL) was opened.  In 1982 the NBL began issuing five-dollar coins, and in6
dollarized territory is Puerto Rico with little under 4 million people, and the smallest is
Pitcairn Island with 50 people.  In 1998 the median population in the independent
dollarized countries’ was 63,000 people; the median population in the territories was
even smaller, at 19,000 people.   Another characteristic of these economies is that they
are extremely open.  In most of them there are no controls on capital mobility or on any
type of financial transactions.  So much so, that in 2001 6 out of the 13 independent
dollarized nations are in the OECD list of “Unfair Tax Havens,” or countries whose lax
financial regulations, according to the OECD, allow individuals and corporations to
evade taxes.  These fundamental characteristics of the dollarized economies – very small
and extremely open – already suggest that using a broad control group of all non-
dollarized countries, which are much larger and not as open, may indeed generate biased
results.
8 
II.2  Comparative Analysis With an Unadjusted Control Group
In Table 2 we present, for the dollarized economies for which we have
information, summary statistics on inflation, per capita GDP growth, and the standard
deviation of growth.  In order to put things in perspective we also present data on these
three variables for an “unadjusted” control group that includes all countries with a
currency of their own.  This unadjusted control group contains 4,910 observations. In
Column (C) we present data on mean and median differences between dollarized and
non-dollarized countries for each of the three macroeconomic variables of interest.  The
numbers in parenteses are t-statistics for the significance of these differences.  The test
for the means differences is a standard t-statistic, while the medians differences test is a t-
test obtained using a bootstrapping procedure. These results indicate that the difference in
inflation means is very large and statistically significant; on average inflation in
dollarized nations has been 55 percentage points lower than in non dollarized countries.
The difference in inflation medians is still negative, much smaller (- 5 percentage points),
and still statistically significant.  The difference in GDP growth means is –0.7 percentage
points, and statistically significant; the difference in medians is  – 1.4 percentage points,
                                                                                                                                                                            
1989 it began issuing five-dollar notes.  On Liberia’s dollarization experience see Barret (1995) and
Berkeley (1993).
8   The median population of all non-dollarized emerging nations is over 100 times larger than that of the
dollarized economies.7
and is also statistically significant.  The results for growth volatility are mixed: while the
difference in medians is statistically negative, the difference in means is not statistically
different from zero. We also computed a non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis χ 
2 tests on the
equality of the distributions of the dollarized and non-dollarized groups. These tests
indicate that the two groups had different distributions during the period under study.
Using a slightly narrower control group comprised of emerging markets only did not alter
the conclusions in Table 2.  
As pointed out earlier, a potential limitation of these comparisons is that the
control group may not be the appropriate one.  If this is the case, the results presented in
Table 2 may be subject to a “treatment bias.”
9 In section III we deal with this issue in
detail and we report new results obtained using a technique aimed at defining appropriate
control groups. 
III.  Dollarization and Performance:  A Matching Estimator Approach
III.1 Methodological Issues
Comparative macroeconomic analyses have traditionally relied on regression
equations of the following type:
(1)  y  j t = β x j t + γ D j t + ε j t. 
Where y is the variable of interest –GDP growth, say--, x is a vector of controlling
variables, D is the “event” or “treatment” dummy (dollarization, for example), and ε is an
error term. In this setting, the analyst is interested in estimating parameter γ, which
captures the effect of the “treatment” on the outcome variable y.
10  A potential problem
with this approach, however, is that the “treatment” – the decision to dollarize, in our
case -- may not be the result of a random experiment. If this is the case, the estimated
conditional effect of the “treatment” on y, will be a biased estimator of the “true” effect.
The reason for this is that some of the covariates (x) may affect the outcome (y) in a non-
                                                          
9   See Maddala (1983).
10 In standard regression analysis the coefficient γ captures the mean effect of the “event” on y.  It is
perfectly possible, however, to estimate the effect of the event on the median (or any other quantile) of the8
linear fashion. If this nonlinear term is excluded from the regression, we will face an
“omitted variable” bias (see Maddala, 1983 and Heckman et. al. 2001, for details on the
“treatment” bias).
One way of dealing with this problem is by using non-parametric methods, including
the matching estimators technique developed in the training evaluation literature (see
Blundell and Costa Dias, 2000).
11  This approach consists of using the available data to
re-establish the conditions of a natural experiment. A general advantage of this non-
parametric method is that no particular specification of the underlying model has to be
assumed.  We can restate the question at hand – what is the effect of dollarization on
performance –in the following way:
(2)                          Ψ  =  E(y1 - y0/x,D=1). 
Where y1 is, say, per capita GDP growth in countries that receive the dollarization
“treatment.” y0 is per capita GDP growth in those that have not received the treatment,
and x are observable covariates. As before,
 D is a dummy variable that takes the value of
one if the observation is subject to the treatment, and the value of zero otherwise. In
words, equation (2) captures the mean effect of dollarization on the dollarized countries’
performance.  The analyst’s problem, however, is that he does not have data to estimate
E(y0/x,D=1), the “outcome” in dollarized countries, had they not dollarized
12. Matching
estimators use the existing data to construct an appropriate sample counterpart for the
missing information. This is done by pairing each dollarized country with countries from
the non-dollarized group (Blundell and Costa Dias 2000). If the sample is large enough,
for each treated (dollarized) observation we can find, in principle, at least one untreated
observation with exactly the same characteristics.  Each of these properly selected
untreated observations provides the required counterfactual for our comparative
                                                                                                                                                                            
dependent variable.  In the empirical results presented below we focus both on mean and median
differences of the dependent variables.
11   Lalonde (1986) is the classic paper on training evaluation.
12 If we estimate the equation above using all non-treated observations the selection bias is given by:
  ) 0 , / ( ) 1 , / ( ) ( 0 0 = − = = D x u E D x u E x B .9
analysis.
13  The problem is that under most general conditions it is not possible to find an
exact match between a treated and untreated observation. The matching estimator method
focuses on estimating an average version of the parameter of interest
14. That is, the
matching estimator consists of obtaining the difference in outcome as an average of the
differences with respect to “similar” --  rather than identical -- untreated outcomes. The
matching estimator M ˆ  can be written as
15: 




j ij i i y W y w S M ) ( ) ( ˆ .
Where T and C are respectively the sets of treated and untreated countries,  ij W  are
weights attached to each untreated observation j that is “matched” with treated country i,
and i w are the weights that allow us to reconstruct the outcome distribution for the treated
sample. 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) have shown that an efficient and simple way to
perform this comparison is to rely on a propensity score, defined as the probability of
participation or treatment: P(x)=Prob(D=1/ x). In our case, this is the probability of a
country being dollarized. This reduces a multi-dimensional problem to a one-dimensional
problem, provided that we can estimate P(x). Instead of matching countries directly on all
of their characteristics, we can compare countries with similar probability of dollarizing.  
In this paper, and in order to explore the robustness of the results, we use two
alternative methods for computing matching estimators.  First, we use a simple-average
nearest neighbor estimator. According to this method, for each treated observation, we
                                                          
13 In order to guarantee that all treated agents have such a counterpart in the population (not necessarily in
the sample) we also need to assume that  1 ) / 1 ( Pr 0 < = < x D ob .
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where S is a subset of the support of x given D=1.10
select a pre-determined number of untreated nearest neighbor(s). The nearest neighbors
of a particular treated observation i are defined as those untreated observations that have
the smallest difference in propensity score with respect to i. If we choose to use nn




=  for the observations that have been selected; for other
observations we set  ij W =0.  We applied the above method to both one nearest neighbor
and five nearest neighbors.  The second method consists of using local linear regressions
to identify each matching observation (Fan 1993).
III.2 Results
In this section we present the basic results from the computation of matching
estimators for inflation, growth and growth volatility for the period 1970-1998.  The
section is organized as follows: we first present the results from a probit model of
dollarization, which we use to compute the propensity scores.  We then report the results
obtained from the calculation of matching estimators proper.
Propensity Scores
We used a 199-country unbalanced panel data set to estimate a random-effect
probit model on the probability of a country being dollarized at a particular point in
time
16. The dependent variable takes a value of one if country j is dollarized in year k.
Although many of the dollarized economies do not collect extensive data, we were able
to obtain information on a number of covariates that capture geographical, economic and
political characteristics of the countries in the sample.  The following independent
variables were used in the probit estimation: (a) Initial GDP, taken as a measure of the
country’s economic size.  (b) Population measured in millions of people, as an alternative
index of size.  (c) An indicator that measures the degree of openness of the economy.  For
the majority of countries and years we used the Sachs and Warner (1995) openness index,
that takes a value of one if the country in question is open to international trade, and zero
otherwise. We used data from a variety of sources to supplement the Sachs-Warner index
                                                                                                                                                                            
15   See Blundell and Costa Dias (2000).  Persson (2001) has used matching estimators in a study of
monetary unions and trade
16   We will use the term “country” to refer both to independent nations as well as to territories.  On
propensity scores see, for example, Drake (1993) and Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983).11
for those countries and years not covered in their sample.
17  (d) A dummy variable that
takes the value of one if the country in question is an island.  (e) A dummy variable that
takes the value of one if the country has a common boarder with a nation whose currency
is defined by the IMF as a “convertible currency.”  (f) A variable that measures the
country’s geographical location, as captured by its latitude.  And (g), a dummy variable
that takes the value of one if the economy in question is an independent nation.
18 The
data set covers 1970 through 1998, and has a total of 5,290 observations, of which 386
correspond to dollarized economies.  The results obtained are summarized in Table 3, and
provide useful information on the probability of a country being dollarized.  For example,
according to these results smaller, non-independent economies are more likely to be
dollarized.  Also, more open economies that have a common border with a country with a
convertible currency have a higher probability of being dollarized.  As may be seen, the
fit is quite satisfactory, with the pseudo R
2 exceeding 0.43.  The estimated probabilities
of being dollarized obtained from this equation were used to define the matching
observations in the computation of alternative matching estimators
19.
Nearest Neighbor Matching Estimators
We computed nearest neighbor estimators “with replacement” and “without
replacement.” In the “with replacement” case an observation for an untreated country
may be selected as the nearest neighbor for several dollarized countries. In the “without
replacement” case each untreated country observation may be the nearest neighbor to
only one dollarized country in a particular year. This option requires more data points but
reduces the risk of using too few comparison countries.  In terms of number of neighbors,
we considered both “one nearest neighbor” as well as “five nearest neighbors.” In total,
then, we use four “adjusted” control groups:
•  One nearest neighbor, with replacement;
                                                          
17   See the original Sachs-Werner (1995) article for a specific list of requirements for a country to qualify
as “open.”
18   Unfortunately, only three of the dollarized economies have data on other variables of interest, including
terms of trade, investment, the fiscal balance, and interest rates.
19   As an alternative method, for each dollarized country we restricted the matching observations to
correspond to the same non-dollarized country for every year in the sample.  In order to do this, the
propensity scores were re-calculated from a cross-country probit regression for 1970.  The results obtained
from these country-to-country matching estimators are very similar to those reported in Table 6 and are not
reported due to space considerations.  They are available on request.12
•  One nearest neighbor, without replacement;
•  Five nearest neighbors, with replacement;
•  Five nearest neighbors, without replacement.
In Table 4 we summarize some key data for the “adjusted” control groups
constructed using the propensity scores methodology.  For comparison purposes we also
present data on the dollarized economies, and on all non-dollarized economies – the latter
group is the “unadjusted” control group used in the previous section.  Simple inspection
reveals that the new adjusted control groups have a greater degree of similarity with the
dollarized nations, than the original unadjusted control group.  For example, the new
control groups include economies that are smaller, more open and have a higher initial
income per capita than the average for the unadjusted sample.  This table also reflects the
fact that the “adjusted” control groups have a significantly smaller number of
observations (or “controls”) than the unadjusted control group made of all non-dollarized
economies.
The results from the matching estimators are presented in Table 5.  For each
variable of interest –inflation, growth, and volatility -- we report data on (a) the number
of countries and number of observations in the control group; (b) The “mean difference,”
calculated as the mean of the differences, for each variable, of the dollarized economies
and the corresponding non-dollarized control group.  And (c) the “median difference,”
calculated as the median of the differences of the dollarized economies and the
corresponding non-dollarized control group.  For both the mean and the median
difference we present, in parentheses, a t-statistic for their statistical significance.  As in
Table 2 the test for the mean difference is a standard t-statistic, while that for the
difference in median was calculated using a bootstrapping procedure.  Finally, and for
comparison purposes, we report again the means and medians differences obtained when
the unadjusted control group of all dollarized countries is used.  We refer to these
differences as “unadjusted comparisons.”  
Our results may be summarized as follows: First, for every one of the matching
indicators both the mean and median difference in inflation are negative and significantly
different from zero.  This indicates that the dollarized economies have had significantly
lower yearly rate of inflation than the non-dollarized countries.  According to these13
results, however, the mean difference in inflation is much smaller that what the simple,
uncorrected comparisons would suggest.  Indeed, while according to the results reported
in Table 2 the “unadjusted means difference” in inflation is –55 percentage points per
year, the mean difference obtained using matching estimators range from -3.5 to -5.7
percentage points per year. These differences are partially due to the fact that, while the
unadjusted control group includes hyperinflation episodes, the “matching” control groups
exclude hyperinflation.  But, as the results for “median differences” in Table 2 indicate,
hyperinflation is not the only reason.
20  Indeed, our matching results indicate that the
median difference in inflation between non-dollarized and dollarized countries ranges
from 1.92% to 4.45% per year.  These median differences reported in Table 5 are
significantly smaller than the 5.2% difference in medians obtained when the non-adjusted
control group of non-dollarizers was used (Table 2).  
Second, for every one of the matching indicators the GDP per capita growth
differences – both for means and medians -- are negative.  And they are significantly
negative in seven out of the eight matching estimators reported in Table 5; the only
exception is for the mean difference using one nearest neighbor.  Overall we interpret
these results as providing fairly strong evidence that, once appropriate control groups are
defined, the dollarized economies have tended to experience lower GDP per capita
growth than the non-dollarized ones.  This conclusion is, in fact, supported by the local
linear regression results reported below.  In terms of magnitudes, the results from the
matching analysis indicate that dollarized countries’ underperformed no-dollarized
countries by a wider margin than what simple comparisons suggest.  The (statistically
significant) mean differences in GDP per capita growth in Table 5 range from –1.56%
per year to –1.12% per year; the unadjusted mean difference in Table 2 is only –0.69%.
The median differences in GDP per capita growth in Table 5 range from –1.53% per year
to –1.01% per year; the unadjusted mean difference in Table 2 is –1.41%.    
And third, statistically speaking, the matching results reported in Table 5 indicate
there are no differences (either in the means or medians) in volatility in dollarized and
non-dollarized economies.  This contrast with the results obtained from the raw
                                                          
20  By using medians we make sure that outliers do not drive our results.14
comparisons, which suggested that volatility was significantly higher in the dollarized
nations (see Panel C in Table 2). 
III.3 Extensions: Local Linear Regressions
The results reported in Table 5 were obtained using an average nearest neighbor
approach.   An alternative method for computing matching estimators consists of using
local linear regressions (LLR), a non-parametric technique similar to traditional kernel
regression
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An alternative, but equivalent, way of implementing LLR is the following: For
each treated observation we run a weighted least square regression of the outcomes on the
differences of the propensity scores.  The intercept from this weighted regression is a
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where a and b are parameters, j indexes untreated observations and i refers to treated
observations.  The results obtained when this LLR matching method was used confirmed15
those presented in Table 5.  What is particularly important in terms of this paper, is that
these estimates indicate that GDP per capita growth has indeed been significantly lower
in the dollarized countries than in the non-dollarized ones.  The estimated means
difference in GDP growth per capita using the LLR is –1.16, with a t-statistic of –5.34.
The estimated difference in medians is –1.32 with a t-statistic of –8.31.  
IV.  Concluding Remarks
In the aftermath of the currency crises of the 1990s some economists have argued
that the emerging economies should give up their domestic currencies, and adopt an
advanced nation’s currency as legal tender.  Interestingly, there have been no systematic
comparative studies on the performance of countries that, indeed, officially use another
nations’ currency.   Most of the literature on the subject has been based on case studies of
Panama.  This lack of empirical analyses has resulted in policy debates that, until now,
have been based on conjectures and not on hard historical evidence.  
The purpose of this paper has been to analyze, from a comparative perspective,
economic performance in “dollarized” economies.  We have argued that the main
difficulty in performing this type of comparison refers to defining the correct “control
group” with which to compare the performance of the dollarized countries.  In this paper
we tackled this issue by using the “matching estimators” technique developed in the
training evaluation literature.  We found that the matching estimators technique yield
somewhat different results than raw comparisons using a large control group of all non-
dollarized countries.  More specifically, we found that dollarized countries have had a
significantly lower rate of inflation than non-dollarized ones.  The mean difference
ranged from 3.4% to 5.7% per year.  We also found that dollarized countries have had a
statistically lower rate of GDP per capita growth than non-dollarized ones.  Both the
mean and median growth differences are approximately 1% per year.  Finally, we found
that there has been no statistical difference in macroeconomic volatility between
dollarized and non-dollarized economies.  
                                                                                                                                                                            
21 This estimator improves on kernel regression in two ways: a) the bias of the LLR estimator does not
depend on the design density of the data (i.e. on the density f(P(x)); and b) the order of convergence is the
same at the boundry points as at the interior points. For details see Fan (1992, 1993).16
The results reported here do not imply that dollarization is an inferior monetary
arrangement for all countries.  Indeed, our results only refer to an historical comparison
of the performance of economies that have had an official dollarized regime.  As data
from more recent experiences with “dollarization” become available, it will be possible to
gain further insights into the performance of countries that adopt this monetary regime.
In particular, the recent cases of Ecuador, El Salvador and Guatemala will provide
information on how mid-size economies fare under this regime.   17
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Table 1
Dollarized countries and territories: 
Experiences and data availability
PANEL A: Independent Countries
Data Availability
Country Population Currency  Growth Inflation
Andorra 73,000 France, Spain 1971-1998 -
Kiribati (1980) 82,000 Australia
† 1971-1998 1983-1997
Liberia 2,900,000 USA 1971-1981 1971-1981
Liechtenstein 31,000 Switzerland 1971-1998 1971-1997
Marshall Inds. (1987) 61,000 USA 1971-1998 1982-1997
Micronesia 130,000 USA 1971-1998 1987-1998
Monaco 32,000 France 1971-1998 -
Nauru 10,000 Australia 1971-1998 1989-1998
a
Palau (1995) 17,000 USA 1971-1998 -
Panama 2,700,000 USA 1971-1998 1971-1997
San Marino 26,000 Italy
† 1971-1998 1985-1998
Tuvalu (1979) 11,000 Australia
† 1971-1998 1983-1998
Vatican City 900 Italy - -
PANEL B: Non-Independent Territories
Data Availability
Country Population Currency Used Growth Inflation
American Samoa 65,000 USA -
Cocos Islands 600 Australia -
Cook Island 20,200 New Zealand 1971-1998 1983-1998
Greenland 60,000 Denmark 1987-1997 1971-1998
Guam 150,000 USA -
Niue 2,000 New Zealand -
Norfolk Islands 1,900 Australia -
N. Mariana Inds. 70,000 USA -
Pitcairn Island 50 New Zealand, USA -
Puerto Rico 3,880,000 USA 1971-1998 1974-1998
Saint Helena 7,000 UK -
Tokelau 1,500 New Zealand -
Turks & Caicos 17,000 USA -
UK Virgin Inds. 19,000 USA -
US Virgin Inds. 120,000 USA -
Sources: Bogetic (2000), CIA Fact Book, U.S. Congress Joint Economic Committee, October, 2001
 and The Statesman’s Yearbook. Other recently dollarized countries and territories include East Timor (US dollar),
Ecuador (US dollar), El Salvador (US dollar) and Kosovo (German mark).
a Consumer Price Index for Nauru is not available for the years 1994-1996.
 † Also own coins in circulation.21
TABLE 2
Inflation, Growth and Volatility 
in Dollarized and Non-Dollarized Economies













Mean 4.30 59.42 -55.11
(-11.34)
Median 3.80 9.00 5.20
(-13.31)
B.  Per capita GDP growth
Mean 0.58 1.26 -0.69
(-1.96)
Median 0.44 1.85 -1.41
(-4.73)
C.    Volatility of Growth
Mean 6.45 5.58 0.87
(0.99)
Median 5.72 4.85 0.87
(2.77)
a:  Number of observations is 386.
b:  Number of observations is 4,910.
*:  Number in parentheses are t-statistics  22
TABLE 3
Probit Estimate of Propensity Score
Coef. Std. Err. z P>z
GDP0 1.14 5.53 0.21 0.837
POP -4.31 3.81 -11.30 0.000
BORDER 0.87 0.10 8.60 0.000
ISLAND -1.10 0.09 -1.18 0.237
LATITUDE -2.94 0.30 -9.86 0.000
OPEN 1.65 0.10 16.30 0.000
INDEP -0.44 0.08 -5.38 0.000
Constant -0.38 0.12 -3.20 0.001
Number of obs 5290
LR chi2(7) 1,192.17
Prob > chi2 0.000
Log likelihood  -785.92
Pseudo R2 0.43
Note: Dependant variable is 1 if a country uses a foreign currency during
that year.  For a description of the independent variables see the text.23
TABLE 4






(0 to 1 index)
Latitude
(0 to 1 index)
Indep. Comm
Border






Group Mean Med Mean Med Mean Med Mean Med % % %
a.  Dollarized Countries
All 0.457 0.030 7,594 2,928 0.53 1.00 0.25 0.10 67 33 60 15 386
b.      Non-Dollarized Countries
All 26.630 5.113 3,968 1,638 0.22 0.00 0.28 0.23 92 18 26 184 4,910
M1R 0.976 0.671 7,636 1,816 0.36 0.00 0.15 0.14 100 20 58 29 386
M1N 0.281 0.589 7,518 4,206 0.46 0.23 0.18 0.18 69 26 73 35 386
M5R 0.872 0.365 7,194 2,254 0.35 0.00 0.17 0.18 79 25 67 40 1,930
M5N 1.213 0.483 5,349 1,848 0.23 0.00 0.23 0.19 81 17 55 79 1,930
*:  M1R refers to one nearest neighbor, with replacement. M1N refers to one nearest neighbor, without replacement. M5R refers to five nearest
neighbors, with replacement. M5N refers to five nearest neighbors, without replacement.24
TABLE 5
Matching Estimators:  











M1R 22 197 -3.53 -3.15
(-5.68) (-4.00)
M1N 28 197 -3.39 -1.92
(-5.01) (-2.82)
M5R 31 985 -3.89 -4.45
(-9.03) (-9.89)
M5N 53 985 -5.68 -4.42
(-5.98) (-8.41)
B. GDP per capita growth
M1R 29 386 -0.28 -1.05
(-0.47) (-3.03)
M1N 35 386 -1.56 -1.53
(-2.78) (-3.88)
M5R 40 1,930 -1.12 -1.01
(-2.48) (-3.34)
M5N 79 1,930 -1.19 -1.30
(-2.78) (-2.71)
C.Volatility of Growth
M1R 12 386 0.86 0.42
(0.63) (0.24)
M1N 16 386 0.62 1.29
(0.40) (0.51)
M5R 71 1930 0.72 1.59
(0.74) (0.86)
M5N
a - - - -
*:  M1R refers to one nearest neighbor, with replacement. M1N refers to one nearest neighbor, without
replacement. M5R refers to five nearest neighbors, with replacement. M5N refers to five nearest neighbors,
without replacement.  Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.
a:  Not computed because the number of observations was too small.Documentos de Trabajo
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